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Seeking Guidance?
New challenges to ‘legislative prayer’
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I

t has long been the tradition of American citizens
to pray for divine blessing and guidance in their
civic business. This tradition, which predates
the founding of the American Republic, finds expression at all levels of government, federal, state,
and local. It was embraced by the First Continental
Congress, the same congress that both employed a
paid chaplain and later drafted the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution; it was maintained during
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment; and it
persists in various guises to this day.
By and large, the language of American civic
benedictions—monotheist, biblically inf lected,
vaguely Protestant—reflects the country’s Christian history and the religious convictions of a large,
albeit diminishing, segment of its population. The
ritual generally consists of a prayer or petition for
the blessings of God—or the Almighty, or Provi- First Prayer in Congress, September 1774, in Carpenters Hall, Philadelphia
dence, or the Heavenly Father—in discharging
the deliberative functions of government. Sometimes the establishment of religion. Thirty years ago, in Marsh v.
prayers are distinctly Christian, invoking Jesus Christ; at Chambers, the Court ruled that the legislative prayer practice
other times they are vaguely Christian; and sometimes they of Nebraska’s state legislature—in which for sixteen years
are not Christian at all. These petitions, which commonly a publicly funded Presbyterian chaplain delivered prayers
include acknowledgments of fallibility accompanied by sup- containing, as Justice William Brennan put it, “Christological
plications for the wisdom to do justice and the protection references”—was constitutional in light of the “unambiguous
of the citizenry, have been assigned the label “legislative and unbroken history” of the tradition of legislative prayer
prayer.” But the civic invocation of divine benediction is dating from our nation’s founding. Marsh held that as long
a much broader American phenomenon, encompassing as the government is not “proselytizing” or “advancing”
Thanksgiving proclamations, presidential addresses, reli- religion—that is, attempting to convert citizens or putting
gious displays on government land, national days of prayer its coercive authority behind a particular faith—legislative
prayer is constitutionally permissible.
and fasting, and so on.
Resolution of the case has been complicated, however, by
Legislative prayer is the subject of the latest religionclause challenge to reach the U.S. Supreme Court: Town a well-meaning but errant doctrinal byway that the Court
of Greece v. Galloway, a case brought by two plaintiffs, one has fitfully pursued since the mid-1980s. In response to
atheist and one Jewish, who claim that the legislative prayer complaints about the display of religious symbols on governpractices of a small enclave in upstate New York are uncon- ment property, several justices began to inquire whether the
stitutional. The prayers selected by the municipality have government had “endorsed” religion in such a way as to cause
been nearly uniformly Christian, and a lower court judged political offense or estrangement. Yet, since the government
both the town’s selection practices and the content of the makes something of a habit of saying offensive things, the
prayers too consistently Christian to pass muster under the Court needed a limiting principle—and so it decided to
Establishment Clause, which proscribes laws “respecting consider only the ostracized sentiments of a hypothetical
“reasonable observer.” That approach—in which the Court
an establishment of religion.”
Evaluated by the conventional materials of constitutional purports to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable
adjudication—constitutional text, historical practice, and offense—has generated considerable consternation, a point
legal precedent—Town of Greece might seem a relatively Justice Elena Kagan acknowledged at oral argument. The
easy case. Going back to the first Congress that drafted the lower court in the case seemingly extended the endorsement
Establishment Clause, the practices comprising legislative test to the issue of legislative prayer, but it does not appear
prayer were never thought to constitute laws respecting an likely that the Supreme Court will follow suit. Instead,
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oral argument zeroed in on other possible standards—the
distinction between “sectarian” and “nonsectarian” prayer,
for instance, or the question of legal coercion.
The best argument for the unconstitutionality of this
particular legislative prayer practice concerns the issue of
coercion. The plaintiffs’ lawyer, Douglas Laycock, argued effectively that the Greece town council—unlike the Nebraska
legislature in Marsh—is not a purely legislative body, since it
exercises various administrative and other functions. Citizens
who appear before it are seeking specific outcomes—zoning
variances, changes in school policies, and the like—and may
be placed in the awkward position of showing the prayer
practice an unwanted respect, or perhaps even of participating in it, in order not to prejudice their claims before the
council. A core function of the Establishment Clause is to
prohibit government from imposing religious doctrine on
the unwilling. Citizens should not be coerced by the state
to act in ways they find religiously objectionable.
Yet this argument faces several obstacles. First, though in
Lee v. Weisman (1992) the Court recognized psychological
coercion as constitutionally problematic in the context of a
middle-school graduation prayer, it would need to extend the
concept considerably. Adult citizens with business before the
town council, unlike middle-schoolers, are not required to
attend the legislative prayer, which, moreover, occurs some
time before the council considers the matters before it. Second, if the Court were to extend the psychological-coercion
approach to this context, it is difficult to see why various
court practices—in which attendees are instructed to rise
as a marshal announces, “God save the United States and
this honorable Court”—are not similarly coercive to those
with business before the court. Third, hybrid governmental
bodies are quite common, and a standard that required judges
to discern between purely legislative and quasi-legislative
bodies would be difficult to administer and might appear
arbitrary. Finally, local legislative bodies have been seeking
divine benediction for centuries. For all these reasons the
nonfunded, volunteer prayers in Greece, New York, seem
to fall within Marsh’s general rule.
The likelihood that the Court will reaffirm Marsh wholesale is uncertain, however, in part because the Court—and
Justice Anthony Kennedy in particular—seemed frustrated
by Marsh’s historical approach. How, Kennedy inquired, can
the mere existence of a tradition be its own justification?
What if the tradition turns out to have been a “historical
aberration,” one lacking a “rational explanation”? Whatever
its status as a moral justification, pastness alone may well
be a constitutional justification. Evidence of past practice
and understanding is relevant to the meaning of the Establishment Clause and legislative prayer’s consistency with it.
Furthermore, characterizing the justification for the tradition
of legislative prayer as a historical accident, or as a brute assertion that “we’ve always done it this way,” implies that the
many generations of Americans who engaged in the practice
for centuries had no reason at all to do so—or that their

reason must have been the impermissible one of declaring
the superiority of Christianity above all other religions.
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n fact they had other reasons. Civic benediction is an
acknowledgement of the limits of government and of
its perpetual capacity to do wrong. To seek divine guidance and protection in the civic context is to recognize
that government is imperfect and fragile, and that human
power—even when exercised thoughtfully and with beneficent intentions— can fail to do justice. At one point in the
oral argument, Justice Kagan rightly observed that “when
we relate to our government, we all do so as Americans,”
not as religious or non-religious individuals. That is true,
and legislative prayer is part of that American heritage. It
is a mechanism for citizens to acknowledge these limitations—personal and systemic—before they make law and
set policy.
Admittedly, these are not beliefs everyone shares; atheists no less than religious persons may be confident that
the government can provide, and ought to provide, perfect
justice. But they are beliefs that lie embedded in American constitutional governance. When the Preamble of the
Constitution sets out the People’s aspiration to form a “more
perfect Union,” that is a tacit civic affirmation that the
Constitution is not perfect now and can never be made so.
As the work of human hands, it is inherently imperfect,
for if it were perfect, neither it nor the Union itself would
ever change. But they do change, by the illumination of resources outside themselves. A primary function of legislative
prayer has always been to express humility about government’s powers—uncertainty about its judgments—and to
affirm the separation of the realm of politics and law from
whatever realms lie beyond it. The reasons for exploring
the long, unbroken historical tradition of legislative prayer
recognized in Marsh relate not to the might of religion, but
to the tragic weakness of government. Legislative prayer
thus reflects an understanding of the separation of church
and state—an acknowledgment of distinct jurisdictions of
authority and truth. And this is the sense in which history
can be a guide to the future.
It may be that Americans today no longer perceive legislative prayer in these terms—perhaps due to increased religious
pluralism, or to the attenuation of compatriotism and civic
fellowship, or to the growing sense that government is indeed the sole available source of justice and ought to achieve
nothing less than perfect law. And so we should be cautious
about the uses of legislative prayer, and ready to question its
political wisdom. But recognizing the independent spheres of
government and of what lies outside it reflects an ancient yet
supple reason—one rooted in American legal tradition—for
upholding the constitutionality of this practice. n
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